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Functional Works of Art:
Copyright, Design Patent,
or Both?
By JOAN PAUL*
Many people today seem to prefer handcrafted household arti-
cles. It is not uncommon to see handmade pottery dishes or tiles,
leaded glass lampshades or windows, and handblown glassware in
homes today. Frequently the owners have acquired such articles
directly from artists exhibiting and selling at craft shows. Home-
owners and architects also commission designers and craftspeople
to create custom designs for fixtures, furniture, and other house-
hold articles. The people creating these works are artists and put
primary emphasis on graphic and sculptural aspects of the works.
Because of increasing demand, it is now more possible than ever
for an artist to make a reasonable living by designing and
fabricating functional works of art.'
Legal protection against commercial piracy of an individual's
creations is therefore a matter of great interest and significance.
Through the patent and copyright statutes, Congress has provided
several types of protection against commercial exploitation. These
acts were expressly authorized by the framers of the Constitution
who empowered Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries."* In the nearly 200 years since then, patent and copyright
laws have undergone a rather extensive but separate evolution. Al-
Member, Third Year Class
1. For purposes of this note, "applied works of art" and "functional works of art" mean
any objects which have both utilitarian function and qualities of artistic merit independent
of the utilitarian function. The qualities of artistic merit may be present either as a pictorial
work applied on or to a useful object or in the overall shape of the object. Examples include
stained and leaded glass panels serving as windows; ceramic vases; glass, ceramic or cast
metal lamp bases; and certain hand-crafted and sculptured furniture.
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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though both patent and copyright statutes appeared early in legis-
lative history, Congress did not specifically provide protection for
the visual artist until 1842 in the case of design patent," and 1870
in the case of copyright.'
From its inception, the design patent was intended to protect a
designer's efforts as applied to or embodied in useful articles.'
In contrast, the first copyright statute covering works of art of-
fered its protection only to "fine arts."7 Thus in 1870, the visual
artist's choice of protection was determined by a simple standard:
whether or not the work would be incorporated in a useful article.
The appropriateness of the particular protection afforded was not
a consideration. If, because it was incorporated in a useful article, a
work was ineligible for copyright but did not meet the more rigor-
ous requirements of a design patent, the artist was precluded from
any protection whatsoever.
In 1909, the "fine arts" limitation was removed in a new copy-
right statute (hereinafter, "the 1909 Act") enacted by Congress.6
For the first time, an artist whose work was applied to an article of
manufacture apparently could make choices as to what types of
protection to seek for her design: copyright, patent, or both. Under
the new statute, there was an arguable overlap of protectable pat-
ent and copyright subject matter. But, since there was neither
statutory language nor legislative history indicating a purpose to
create such an overlap, the courts decided that Congress did not
intend dual protection.9 This position led to the development of
the "election doctrine," requiring the artist to choose between
copyright or design patent.'0
Further, shortly after enactment of the 1909 Act, the Copyright
Office adopted regulations refusing copyright registration to works
4. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543.
5. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.
6. See generally Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protec-
tion in the United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 380 (1948). Examples of designs applied to
or embodied in useful articles, and eligible for design patent protection under the original
statute include overall shape of spoons and forks (Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
511 (1872)) and designs for the printing of fabrics. See Hudson, supra at 381; Act of Aug.
29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 541-44.
7. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.
8. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1076-77.
9. Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910), aff'd,
191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), a/J'd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
10. Id.
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of art that had any utilitarian purpose.1 This position was eventu-
ally changed, so that utilitarian purpose or intent is not a consider-
ation in determining copyrightability as long as the work embodies
"some creative authorship in delineation or form."12
In 1954, the Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt as to
whether a work of art which is embodied in a utilitarian article or
is intended for commercial or mass production is eligible for copy-
right by holding, in the landmark case of Mazer v. Stein," that a
statuette of a Balinese dancer used as a lamp base could be copy-
righted. Because the issue of dual patent and copyright protection
was not before the Court, the validity of the election doctrine was
not decided.14 However, the Court did rule that "[Tihe patentabil-
ity of statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright
as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says
that because a thing is patentable, it may not be copyrighted."15
The Mazer Court also made it clear that the protection offered by
patent and copyright is quite different.1 6 Overlap of protection was
finally legitimized in a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals case
in 1974."7
Perhaps even more important, the long-awaited revision of the
1909 Act, effective January 1, 1978, has expressly codified the hold-
ing in Mazer.1 8 Unfortunately, however, the new Act has also codi-
fied the old copyright regulation refusing copyright registration to
the form or shape of a utilitarian article, regardless of the artistic
merit of the creation, unless the work has a separate and indepen-
dent artistic identity.19 This section is based on a persistent policy
prevailing in the legislature" and the courts,2' denying copyright
11. Regulation 12(g), reprinted in Pogue, Borderland-Where Copyright and Design
Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L. REV. 33, 44 (1953). The Rules and Regulations issued by the
Register of Copyrights were subject to the approval of the Librarian of Congress. The Regis-
ter, under the 1909 Act, was authorized to make rules and regulations for the registration of
copyrights. Ch. 391, § 207, 61 Stat. 666 (1947) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III
1979)).
12. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1980).
13. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
14. Id. at 217.
15. Id.
16. The Court stated: "The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and
utility but are for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental design for
design patents." Id. at 218.
17. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (Supp. Ill 1979).
19. See definition of "pictorial, graphic or sculptural work," 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(b).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House
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protection to industrial designs. That policy, in turn, is based on a
fear by Congress and the courts that an overly lenient standard for
copyright of the design of utilitarian articles will lead to copyright
of industrial design in fact. This should not present a problem for
serious visual artists, even those applying their works to useful ar-
ticles. Theoretically there is no difficulty in establishing a separate
artistic identity in a work of art applied to a functional object if, as
suggested by Judge Learned Hand in Reiss v. National Quotation
Bureau," a sufficiently broad view is taken by the courts concern-
ing the presence of artistic merit."' The courts, however, seem to
be lagging behind in recognizing subtle trends of modern art which
emphasize line and form."
The artist of today and her attorney, then, face a complex maze
of decisions. Initially, inquiry centers on which type of protection
the artist should seek: what is the likelihood of success in attempts
to secure registration for either copyright or design patent, or both,
and the likelihood of success in defending against attacks on their
validity? These factors must be balanced with others, such as the
expense and complexity of the application and registration
processes.
This note offers possible answers to these questions in a two-
part discussion: first, the general state of the law is explored, in-
cluding commentary about the propriety of certain aspects of its
development; then a practical guide for artists is presented. The
discussion of current law analyzes the requirements, limitations,
and scope of statutory protection, along with relevant judicial deci-
sions and doctrines. The practical guide consists of a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of each type of protection, and
it poses suggestions for artists who might be concerned with over-
coming judicial prejudice toward modern art. This discussion is di-
Report].
21. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 908
(1979); see House Report at 105.
22. Id. at 805.
23. 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
24. In discussing the proposition that the "Constitution embalms inflexibly the habits of
1789," Judge Hand observed: "[I]ts grants to Congress comprise not only what was then
known, but what the ingenuity of man should devise thereafter." Id. at 719.
25. See, e.g., 591 F.2d at 805, where the court stated: "We may concede, for present pur-
poses, that [such] an interpretation of . . . [the Copyright Office Regulation] will have a
disproportionate impact on designs that exhibit the characteristics of abstract sculpture.
But we can see no justification . . . for extending the nondiscrimination principle of Bleis-
tein . . . ." See note 104 and accompanying text, infra, for an explanation of this principle.
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rected to works created on or after January 1, 1978, the effective
date of the new copyright act (hereinafter, "the Act")." Common
law copyright is not within the scope of this discussion; the new
Act rendered it obsolete for works fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and which otherwise qualify as copyrightable subject
matter. 7
I
Legal Analysis
A. Design Patent Protection .
At the outset it is important to distinguish the type of protection
afforded designs by copyright and by patent. Copyright of a design
protects that particular design28 from copying by others" and
reserves to the artist the exclusive right to apply the design to arti-
cles of manufacture."0 It does not preclude another from enjoying
economic benefit from a design coincidentally similar or even iden-
tical to the artist's, as long as the second artist has created the
design independently." A copyright may therefore be regarded as
a limited monopoly. A design patent, on the other hand, provides
an absolute monopoly to make, use, or sell an ornamental design as
applied to an article of manufacture." Independent creation will
not enable one to enjoy commercial benefit if a "substantially simi-
lar" design has previously been successfully patented by another.
1. Requirements
The requirements for issuance of a design patent are more de-
manding than those for copyright.8 * A design patent application
26. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.§§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979)).
27. House Report at 52; 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Particular categories of works and/or designs which are protected
by copyright include: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and cho-
reographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audio-
visual works; and sound recordings. Id.
29. Id. § 106(1).
30. Id. § 113(a).
31. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A] (1980) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMERI.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
33. See Note, Dual Copyright and Design Patent Protection: Works of Art and Orna-
mental Designs, 49 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 543, 548 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mues]. This note
offers an excellent discussion of the development and history of design patents and
copyrights.
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must demonstrate that a design is novel,8 4 original" and non-
obvious. 6 Further, the applicant is required to show that the de-
sign is "ornamental" 7 and not intended primarily for functional
purposes.38
Sufficient novelty exists when the average observer perceives the
new design as being different from any other design rather than
one which is modified or already-existing." Unlike the originality
required for copyright,4 0 design patent novelty and originality are
satisfied only if a design is entirely new."'
The requirement of ornamentality is unique to design patent be-
cause it is concerned only with the appearance of an article of
manufacture, not its mechanical operation." In order for a design
to be ornamental, it must have rudimentary aesthetic appeal.4 3 If
an article of manufacture is attractive because of a mechanical
feature, no patent will issue."
Probably the most difficult hurdle for a design patent applicant
to overcome is "non-obviousness." Congress introduced this lan-
guage in 1952 to replace the confusing judge-made requirement of
"inventiveness."46 Non-obviousness requires that the difference be-
tween applicant's design and the "prior art"46 be such that at the
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
35. Id. § 101.
36. Id. § 103.
37. Id. § 171; see also Mues, supra, at 549 n.33.
38. Id. at 549 n.34.
39. See Application of Abrams, 205 F.2d 202, 203 (C.C.P.A. 1953); Application of John-
son, 175 F.2d 791, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1949).
40. See note 67 and accompanying text, infra.
41. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Waco Prods., Inc. 205 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1953).
42. "In determining validity of a design patent, it is the appearance of the article taken as
a whole which must meet the statutory requirements. . . ." Clark Equipment Co. v. Keller,
570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir. 1978); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
43. Cooper v. Robertson, 38 F.2d 852, 858 (D. Md. 1930), revd on other grounds, 46 F.2d
766 (4th Cir. 1931).
44. See Barofsky v. General Elect. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1031 (1969).
45. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1966).
46. "Prior art" refers to the body of knowledge known to a person skilled in the art. It
consists of enumerated documents, events constructively in the art whether or not known to
those skilled in the art, and principles, even if not known at the time the invention was
made. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCEss 891 (2d ed.
1979). For purposes of design patent, prior art consists of those designs which are similar in
appearance. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1974). This test was applied favor-
ably to applicant's idea of applying a likeness of former Vice President Spiro Agnew to
watch faces. The court held that the applicant's idea was not sufficiently similar to another
88 [Vol. 3
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time the design was made, it would have been non-obvious to
someone having ordinary skill in the art." In 1969, the Supreme
Court held that obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject mat-
ter is to be determined against a background of three factual de-
terminations: the scope of the prior art, the difference between the
prior art and the applicant's invention, and failure of others to cre-
ate a similar invention." Application of this rule among the cir-
cuits is varying and sometimes conflicting. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit requires a design to exhibit exceptional talent beyond
the skill of the ordinary designer;" the Third Circuit requires iden-
tical tests for design and mechanical patents;50 and the Ninth Cir-
cuit 5 ' and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals" require only
a degree of observation which men of ordinary intelligence give.
Although designers may welcome this more lenient approach, it is
difficult to reconcile the Ninth Circuit test with the language of the
provision."
2. Limitations
A design may meet the requirements stated above and neverthe-
less be denied a patent. The statute provides a variety of limita-
tions," including abandonment" and anticipation." No patent will
issue if an inventor has abandoned his invention to the public.57 In
patentee's design of a human figure applied to watch face to be deemed part of the prior art.
Id.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
48. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
49. G. B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prods., Inc., 436 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1971): "To obtain a
design patent is exceedingly difficult."
50. Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1023 (1972).
51. The Ninth Circuit uses an old Supreme Court test announced in Smith v. Whitman
Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 680 (1893) in which the Court relies on [the] "eye of the ordinary
observer, the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordinary acuteness, bringing to the ex-
amination of the article upon which the design has been placed that degree of observation
which men of ordinary intelligence give." See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1970). This test is difficult to square with the language
of § 103. Compare "[Tlhat degree of observation which men of ordinary intelligence give"
(444 F.2d at 299) with "[O]bvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art of which [the invention] pertains" (35 U.S.C. § 103).
52. In re Schilling, 421 F.2d 747 (C.C.P.A. 1970). In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A.
1966).
53. See note 51, supra.
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
55. Id. § 102(c).
56. Id. § 102(a).
57. Abandonment may be express or implied, and is a question of the intent of the inven-
No. 1] 89
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addition, no patent will issue if the invention was known or used in
this country or described in a printed publication in the United
States or a foreign country before invention by the applicant.58
This limitation is known as anticipation.
Another limitation, referred to as the one-year rule, creates a bar
to patent if there is a disclosure of the work in a publication, either
American or foreign, or a public use or sale of the work in this
country more than one year before the patent application." The
one-year rule is strictly enforced. Considering the propensity of
many artists to publish photographs of their works in art or craft
magazines or to exhibit their works at shows and craft fairs, as well
as the tendency of newspapers to feature local artists and their
works, this provision often constitutes a pitfall to those seeking a
design patent.
3. Scope of Design Patent Protection
As already noted, a design patent confers on its owner an abso-
lute monopoly to make, use or sell her invention. 0 This translates
into the absolute right to apply-a particular design idea to any arti-
cle of manufacture and to use or sell any article of manufacture
with this design." The duration of a design patent can be 32, 7 or
14 years, as the applicant chooses.2
B. Copyright Protection for Functional Works of Art
1. Requirements
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright protection for
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible means of ex-
pression." 8 Works of authorship include pictorial, graphic, and
tor. Diligence in seeking patent protection is required on the part of the inventor. Implied
abandonment may occur if the inventor fails to apply for a patent within a reasonable time
after completion of the invention. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (D. C. Cir. 1898);
Englehardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
59. Id. § 102(b). The date of invention is presumed to be the application date. The appli-
cant is permitted to swear under oath that the actual "reduction to practice" (the date the
invention was made) was earlier-but according to this section, only up to one year earlier.
E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRIMER 21-23 (1975).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
61. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 731 (1872); In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203
(C.C.P.A. 1931).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The requirement of publication under the 1909 Act is eliminated.
Under the new law, "fixation in a tangible means of expression is now the dividing line
90 [Vol. 3
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sculptural works," as well as works of applied art." In codifying
Mazer, Congress intended works of applied art to include all "orig-
inal pictorial, graphic, sculptural works that are intended to be em-
bodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass produc-
tion, commercial exploitation and potential availability of design
patent protection.""
In general, to satisfy the originality requirement, the artist need
only establish independent creation." This is accomplished if the
artist can show she contributed some minimal personal effort to
the work." In addition, creativity must be shown as a separate re-
quirement. Although the terms frequently are used interchange-
ably, originality and creativity are not idehtical for copyright pur-
poses. Unlike other classes of protectible subject matter, works of
art are required by definition to exhibit creativity." The level of
between common-law and statutory protection." House Report at 52. The medium of ex-
pression may be any that is "now known or later developed." 17 U.S.C. § 102. It is the
legislative intent that statutory copyrightability not depend upon the particular medium in
which the work is fixed, thereby giving an artist great latitude for expression. House Report
at 52.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
65. Id. § 113(a).
66. Id.; see also House Report at 105.
67. The Act incorporates without change the standard of originality established by the
courts under the 1909 Act. The artist need only establish independent creation. Novelty,
ingenuity and aesthetic merit are not required. House Report at 51. Even if a work is com-
pletely identical with someone else's work, it is still eligible for copyright protection as long
as it is not copied and is a product of the independent efforts of the artist. 1 NIMMER
§ 2.01[A]. As Judge Learned Hand explained: "[If by some magic a man who had never
known it were to compose anew Keats' Ode On a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author', and,
if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309
U.S. 390 (1940).
68. A standard for originality was laid down by Judge Frank in Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951):
"Original" in reference to a copyrighted works means that the particular work
"owes its origin" to the "author." No large measure of novelty is necessary....
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
"author" contributed something more than a "merely trivial" variation, something
recognizably "his own." Originality in this context "means little more than a pro-
hibition of actual copying." No matter how poor artistically the "author's" addi-
tion, it is enough if it be his own.
69. Although creativity is not mentioned in the statute, the Copyright Office Regulations
impose a requirement of creativity with respect to works of art: "In order to be acceptable
as a work of art, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or
form." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1980). The distinction between originality and creativity was
discussed by the court in Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court noted that while originality relates to the author's independent
contribution to the artwork, creativity contemplates the nature of the work. Creativity
No. 1] 91
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creativity required, however, is minimal.7 0
2. Limitations
Statutory limitations appear in the Act in the form of registra-
tion requirements," copyright notice"7 and a doctrine known as
"fair use."a Although registration is optional, it is strongly en-
couraged by provisions which require registration to bring an in-
fringement action or collect statutory damages." Moreover, a
registration certificate obtained within five years of creation of a
work is prima facie evidence of copyright validity.7 7
Although failure to include copyright notice on a work does not
yield the Draconian results it did under the 1909 Act,76 it behooves
the artist to observe this requirement to insure full protection. A
notice of copyright is required on all works which are distributed
to the public for sale.7 ' The artist need not, however, put notice on
merely refers to the work being artistic in nature, and not supplied through innovations
which are solely utilitarian or mechanical. Id. at 781-82. The 1961 Report of the Register of
Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision, had recommended that in order to qualify for protec-
tion under the new statute, a copyrightable work "must represent an appreciable amount of
creative authorship." REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT, 87TH CONG., 18T SEss., REPORT ON COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION 9 (House Comm. Print 1961). This standard was rejected. See note 67 and
accompanying text, supra; see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6 at 3 (House Comm. Print 1965).
70. See note 104 and accompanying text, infra.
71. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-12.
72. Id. §§ 401-06.
73. Id. § 107. This equitable judicial doctrine used frequently by defendants in infringe-
ment actions is codified for the first time in the Act. It provides that: "Notwithstanding the
[bundle of exclusive rights granted in other provisions of the Act], the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . or by other means specified
[in the Act for] reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright."
74. Id. § 408(a).
75. Id. § 411.
76. Id. § 412.
77. Id. § 410(c).
78. The consequences of omissions or mistakes are far less severe under this Act than
under the 1909 Act. There is no longer an automatic forfeiture of protection if there is an
outright omission of notice. House Report at 146. Copyright protection is not lost when a
work is "published" even if notice is omitted entirely. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a); House Report at
147. Omission of notice will not invalidate copyright "if 'no more than a relatively small
number' of copies . . . have been distributed," or if registration occurs within five years
after publication, "and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to [distributed] copies . . .
after the omission is discovered." Id.
79. Copyright notice is required whenever the work is "published" in the United States or
elsewhere in the world. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a). "Publication" is defined in the Act as "[T]he
distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership . . .
or lending. The offering to distribute copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of fur-
92 [Vol. 3
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works which are merely on display.8 o The Act provides three alter-
native symbols to represent notice,81 but only one, the symbol 0, is
recognized internationally, and therefore it should be used in prac-
tice.82 Another limitation appearing in the Copyright Office Regu-
lations provides that no copyright registration will be permitted if
there already is a patent on the article.88 No such limitation ap-
pears in the new Act, any former Act or in the text of the House
Report on Copyright Law Revision.
The fair use doctrine is a recognition by Congress and the courts
that under certain circumstances others may copy and use copy-
righted material without authorization." Possible examples of fair
use of a copyrighted work include criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research." Note that in asserting the affirmative defense of
fair use, the defendant is not claiming she did not copy, but rather
admitting that she did copy and asserting that her copying and use
is "fair."
The most noteworthy limitation with respect to works of applied
art appears in the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works," an adaptation of a Copyright Office Regulation meant to
"implement" the decision in Mazer v. Stein:8
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar
as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
ther distribution, . . . or public display, constitutes publication. A public . . . display of a
work does not of itself constitute publication." Id. § 101. This is a distinct departure from
the 1909 Act which included a requirement of public display in the definition of publication.
House Report at 146.
80. See definition of "publication," 17 U.S.C. § 101; House Report at 146.
81. These symbols are: (1) the symbol o, or (2) the word, "Copyright," or (3) the abbrevi-
ation "Copyr." 17 U.S.C § 401(b)(1). The year of first publication of the work is also re-
quired along with the name of the copyright owner or an abbreviation by which the name
can be recognized. Id. § 401(b)(2) and (3). The notice is required to be put in a location
which gives "reasonable notice of the claim of copyright." Id. § 401(c).
82. Works copyrighted in the United States are fully eligible for protection abroad under
the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention, which include a notice requirement using
the symbol e. House Report at 144; see also 1 NIMMER § 5.05[B][2][d] at 5-40.
83. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1980).
84. See House Report at 65, 66.
85. Each case raising the question of fair use must be decided on its own facts. The Act
offers four criteria to provide a gauge for balancing the equities: the purpose and character
of the use, especially whether the use is of a commercial nature; the nature of the copy-
righted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the whole
work; and the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
86. See note 91 and accompanying text, infra.
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concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.87
Essentially, this definition establishes separate artistic identity as
a prerequisite to copyright protection. The Act further provides
that there is no change in the law with respect to the scope of pro-
tection afforded to a work portraying a useful article as such,"
thus continuing the policy of refusing copyright protection to in-
dustrial designs.
In commenting on the later provision, the House Report notes
that copyright in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work portraying
something which has no independent artistic identity, such as an
automobile, does not extend to the manufacture of the useful arti-
cle itself.e. For example, if an automobile manufacturer copyrights
working drawings of next year's model, protection extends only to
the drawings. Because the overall shape of the automobile ostensi-
bly has no separate, independent artistic identity, another manu-
facturer may produce an automobile with the exact same shape as
long as he does not copy the first manufacturer's drawings. If the
overall shape of the automobile were deemed to have separate, ar-
tistic identity, then the first manufacturer's copyright of the design
would protect not only the drawings, but would also deter others
from copying the overall shape of the automobile itself and apply-
ing it to their own articles of manufacture.
On the same page of the House Report containing the aforemen-
tioned statement, however, the express intention to adopt the lib-
eral holding of Mazer is also stated and explained: "[C]opyright in
a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work will not be affected if the
work is employed as the design of a useful article, and will afford
protection to the copyright owner against unauthorized reproduc-
tion of his work in useful as well as non-useful articles."9o
In adopting both the Mazer holding and the Copyright Office
Regulations of the mid-1950's which theoretically implemented the
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 113(b).
89. House Report at 105.
90. Id.
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holding in Mazer," the House Report states that Congress was
seeking to draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable
works of applied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial de-
sign." In effect, however, there seems to be an attempted reconcili-
ation between two conflicting approaches. The distinction was to
depend on the "independent artistic identity test," 8 articulated in
the Copyright Office Regulations. However, Congress has neglected
to provide any definitive guidelines for determining when a work
contains artistic elements which can be separated from its utilitar-
ian aspects. The House Report mentions only one factor on which
separability and independence does not depend."
In the absence of such guidelines, rather than a clear line sepa-
rating copyrightable works of applied art from uncopyrightable in-
dustrial designs, there is an unworkable dichotomy, resulting from
the adoption of both the liberal Mazer holding and the narrow
Copyright Office Regulation. The reason is that "the Mazer opin-
ion can be read to mean that any useful article, at least if it is
aesthetically pleasing in appearance, is subject to copyright protec-
tion with respect to its form."" Indeed, Mazer appeared to move
the law much closer to extension of copyright protection to indus-
trial designs. However, the Copyright Office decided to halt the
open-,ended extension of protection suggested by Mazer and, in
1959, adopted a regulation prohibiting copyright protection from
being extended to articles whose sole intrinsic function was their
utility. The fact that an article is unique or attractively shaped is
irrelevant in this situation." It was in this regulation that the Cop-
yright Office first announced the separate artistic identity test as
determinative of eligibility for registration." The regulation, how-
ever, mentions no guidelines for determining when the sole intrin-
sic function of an article is its utility or what constitutes indepen-
dent artistic identity." Predictably, the absence of guidance on
91. See House Report at 54-55; 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1980); 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3].
92. House Report at 55; see 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3].
93. House Report at 55.
94. The test of separability and independence from "utilitarian aspects of the article"
does not depend upon the nature of the design - that is, even if the appearance of an
article is determined by aesthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements,
if any, which can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable.
House Report at 55.
95. 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][31 at 2-88.
96. See id. § 2.08[BJ[3].
97. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1980).
98. Id.
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these questions led to varying judicial applications of the test."
As alluded to above, underlying this regulation was a fear that
copyright registration for all sorts of useful articles with pleasing
shapes would lead to protection for industrial designs and anti-
competitive interests. 00
There is no foundation for this fear. Copyright protects only a
particular expression of an idea,10 and even a particular expression
is not protected to the extent that it can be re-created by the inde-
pendent efforts of another.1"o It is the opinion of this writer that
the Copyright Office unilaterally and without authority or justifica-
tion propounded a stiffer requirement of creativity and artistic
merit for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works applied to articles
of manufacture than was intended by either Congress or the fram-
ers of the Constitution. The regulation seems in direct opposition
to the long line of cases which define as minimal the degree of orig-
inality and creativity necessary to copyright works of art. Indeed,
many courts accept as a work of art "any work which by the most
generous standard may arguably be said to evince creativity." 03
99. See 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3].
100. See note 21, supra; House Report at 55.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); House Report at 53.
102. See note 29 and accompanying text, supra.
103. 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3] at 2-84; Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433
F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970). Perhaps the most well known support of this proposition was of-
fered by Mr. Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1902):
The least pretentious picture has more originality in it than directories and the
like, which may be copyrighted. .. . It would be a dangerous undertaking for per-
sons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language
in which their author spoke. . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they com-
mand the interest of any public, they have a commercial value - it would be bold
to say they have not an aesthetic and educational value, - and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.
(Emphasis added.) Justice Holmes limited this statement to "pictorial illustrations" only
because the copyright act then in effect protected "fine arts" but not works of artistic crafts-
manship. Id. See also Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
holding a simulation of an antique telephone to satisfy the "creativity" requirement. The
minimal nature of this requirement extends also to modern abstract art forms. Reiss v.
National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). As Nimmer summarizes: "[I]f
a work might arguably be regarded as a work of art by a meaningful segment of the popula-
tion, be they high-brow, low-brow, beatnik, avante-garde, middle class bourgeois, adult or
juvenile, then the work must be considered a work of art for copyright purposes of the
Copyright Act." 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B](1) at 2-85.
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Once the Mazer court extended copyright protection to the design
of useful articles,'" the Copyright Office had no authority to legis-
late an additional and inconsistent requirement of artistic merit to
this class of protected subject matter. 05 In light of Mazer, all
"original" pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works applied to or
embodied in useful articles should have been protected under the
1909 Act. Unfortunately, the regulation remained on the books
long enough to attain, in the eyes of Congress, status and validity
and was codified in the Act of 1976.106 As a result, unlike other
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, which need only satisfy the
requirements of originality and creativity, pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works applied to or inherent in useful articles must sat-
isfy some unclear standard of "artistic identity" as well.
Indeed, the force of the regulation has been strengthened in the
Act of 1976 by elimination of the word "sole" which appeared in
the original regulation.'0 7 This implies that if a work has some ar-
104. See text accompanying notes 13-17, supra.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 702. The Register of Copyrights is authorized by the new Act to establish
regulations "not inconsistent with law" for the administration of the functions and duties of
the Register authorized by Title 17. Id. Under the 1909 Act, at the time the Copyright Office
promulgated the Regulation articulating the separate and independent artistic identity test,
the Copyright Office was authorized to "make rules and regulations for the registration of
claims to copyright as provided by this Title." 17 U.S.C. § 207 (1947), reprinted in 4
NIMMER app. 6 at app. 6-1 n.1
The 1909 Act included as eligible for copyright a subcategory described as follows:
"Works of Art; models or designs for works of art." 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1947), reprinted in 4
NIMMER app. 6. The Copyright Office, under the authority granted in the 1909 Act, 4 NIM-
MER app. 11 at 11-1,.promulgated the following regulation following the decision in Mazer v.
Stein to implement registration of works in that subcategory (1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3]):
(a) General. This class includes published and unpublished works of artistic
craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned . . . as well as works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings,
drawings and sculpture.
(b) In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody some
creative authorship in its delineation or form. The registrability of a work is not
affected by the intention of the author as to the use of the work, the number of
copies reproduced, or the fact that it appears on a textile material or textile prod-
uct .
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the arti-
cle is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However,
if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture,
carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are ca-
pable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for
registration.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959), reprinted in 4 NIMMER app. 11 at 11-13.
106. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(b).
107. See note 105, supra.
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tistic merit, but "not enough," it could be rejected for registration
under the current definition.
How the courts will deal with the apparently conflicting expres-
sion of legislative intent expressed in the House Report concerning
copyright of design for works of applied art is not yet known. Nar-
row interpretation of these sections could present an obstacle for
artists whose work is applied to functional objects where the court
is unwilling or unable to recognize separate artistic identity.
In summary, there appears to be a dichotomy in the legislative
intent which is reflected in back-to-back statutory provisions'" re-
garding copyright protection for works of applied art. On one
hand, the liberal holding of Mazer v. Stein is expressly adopted; on
the other, the narrow, unclear Copyright Office regulation is also
adopted, and perhaps even expanded. The two cases on the subject
to date are split; one leaning toward following the old regulation'"
and the other toward the liberal attitude of Mazer.110
3. Scope of Copyright Protection
A work created on or after January 1, 1978 is protected by statu-
tory copyright automatically from the moment of its creation."'
Protection endures for the life of the author plus fifty years.112
The exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright owner include the
right to reproduce copies of the work, distribute copies for sale or
lease, prepare derivative works and display the copyrighted work
publicly."' Recall that, unlike a patent, a copyright does not pro-
tect an artist from independent creation of a design by someone
else."' Moreover, others are not precluded from using any idea re-
vealed by the author's work. 115 Only the particular expression is
protected.
For specially commissioned works of art, copyright ownership
vests automatically in the artist, rather than in the person doing
108. 17 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 113(b).
109. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979).
110. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); see note
119 and accompanying text, infra.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
112. Id. § 302.
113. Id. § 106.
114. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). See also L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
115. Id.
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the commissioning, as was the case under the 1909 Act.""
Copyright in a design for a work of applied art affords protection
against unauthorized reproduction of the work in useful as well as
nonuseful articles.11 7 If the artist is careful to take steps to estab-
lish clearly that her work has a separate and independent artistic
identity,"' the full force of the liberal Mazer holding, as codified
in the 1976 Act, applies.
4. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer
Since passage of the 1976 Act, there have been only two rulings
by Courts of Appeals on copyrightability of design for a useful arti-
cle.n1 One of these cases is the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals case of Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer.1 10 Although the 1976
Act was inapplicable to the case before the court, the new Act and
its legislative history were nevertheless relied on as providing an
"expression of congressional understanding of the scope of protec-
tion for utilitarian articles under the old regulations.""' Artists
whose designs are applied to useful articles will have to contend
with the holding in Esquire when seeking copyright registration.
Esquire had sought registration for the artistic designs of light-
ing fixtures. Its application included photographs of the actual
fixtures as well as their mechanical and electrical parts. Esquire
claimed its designs were eligible for copyright protection as "works
of art" under the 1909 Act. Citing the copyright office regulation
on works of applied art,1 22 the Register declared Esquire's designs
to be ineligible and refused registration noting that this regulation
precludes "registration of the design of a utilitarian article, such as
lighting fixtures, 'when all of the design elements . . . are directly
related to the useful functions of the article. . . .' "I' According to
the Register's analysis, the fixtures did not contain "elements, ei-
ther alone or in combination, which are capable of independent ex-
istence as a copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
116. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
117. Id. § 113(a).
118. See definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works", Id. § 101.
119. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1980). This case
is discussed in the Postscript, infra.
120. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
121. Id. at 802-03.
122. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1980).
123. 591 F.2d at 798.
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apart from the utilitarian aspect.""'
After three refusals by the Copyright Office to register its light-
ing fixture designs, Esquire sought a writ of mandamus from the
district court directing the Register to issue a copyright registra-
tion. The court issued the writ, holding that registration of Es-
quire's designs was compelled by Mazer v. Stein.12 5 The court con-
cluded that an artistic design intended for an outside lighting
fixture qualified as a work of art eligible for copyright despite its
obvious utilitarian purpose and despite the contention that a grant
of copyright would open the floodgates to copyrighting of indus-
trial design.126
In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Register had not
abused her discretion in denying copyright registration to the ar-
tistic design of Esquire's lighting fixture.12 7 The court cited with
approval the Register's interpretation of the Copyright Office regu-
lation that the overall shape of a utilitarian article, no matter how
aesthetically pleasing, is not eligible for copyright protection."
The court distinguished the facts of the case from those in Ma-
zer by noting that the overall shape of the object in Mazer was
concededly a work of art and was therefore eligible for copyright
protection, even though destined to be incorporated in mass-pro-
duced, utilitarian objects. In Esquire, the issue was the indepen-
dent artistic identity of a design for a mass-produced utilitarian
object itself.2
The court gave considerable weight to the Register's interpreta-
tion of the regulation, holding this interpretation to be controlling
unless plainly erroneous.1 a0 The court was persuaded by the Regis-
ter's argument that if the overall shape of a useful article were
copyrightable, widespread copyright protection for industrial de-
signs would ensue, resulting in "obvious and significant anticompe-
titive effects."131
A different presentation of Esquire's case might well have
124. Id. at 798-99.
125. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
126. Id. at 939.
127. 591 F.2d at 806.
128. Id. at 800.
129. Id. at 804-05.
130. Id. at 801.
131. Id.
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yielded a more favorable result. Drawings of his designs emphasiz-
ing overall shape as an independent artistic element may have suc-
ceeded where photographs of the lighting fixtures and their para-
phernalia did not."
Rather than overlook Esquire's somewhat artless presentation,
the court commented as follows:
Specifically, Esquire maintained that it sought registration for
the housing of each fixture, not for the designs of the entire light-
ing assembly-including base, housing, electrical fixture, and light
bulb. But Esquire's applications were not so limited. Each charac-
terized the work for which registration was sought as an "artistic
design for lighting fixtures." The photographs accompanying the
applications portrayed both housing and bases for the lighting
fixtures. No lesser feature was singled out as being that for which
registration was sought. On the basis of these submissions, the
Register could quite reasonably conclude [as she did].18 3
In view of the Esquire holding, artists seeking copyright registra-
tion of designs for useful articles should seek to avoid confusion
between the design of the article and its mechanical parts by care-
fully omitting any mention, graphic representation, or photograph
of strictly utilitarian aspects of the article.
Esquire is one of the first cases in which a court chose between
opposing directions of the new Act.'3 N Plaintiff's presentation of its
design in applying for copyright registration,18 5 coupled with a pos-
sible lack of recognition of modern designs emphasizing line and
form, 36 may well have pushed the court toward its narrow holding.
Had Esquire been more sensitive to the possibility that neither the
Register of Copyrights nor the court would appreciate the exis-
tence of independent artistic identity in modern art, it might not
have put so much emphasis on the utility of the fixtures. A differ-
ent approach might have encouraged the court to lean toward fol-
lowing the broader intent stated in the House Report.
132. See Postscript, note 22 and accompanying text.
133. 591 F.2d at 806 (emphasis added).
134. The "opposing directions" are, on the one hand, the intent to provide broad protec-
tion for artistic design applied to useful articles, as well as an intent that the Act be as
flexible as possible in permitting protection for unborn artistic trends as they appear. 17
U.S.C. § 113(a); House Report at 55, 105. On the other hand, there is a fear that copyright
protection of industrial designs will stifle competitive business interests. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 113(b); House Report at 105.
135. See note 133 and accompanying text, supra.
136. See notes 154 and 155, and accompanying text, infra.
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One of the more regretable aspects of the Esquire holding is the
weight given to the Register's interpretation of the regulations
defining boundaries between copyrightable works of art and un-
copyrightable industrial designs." Although the final determina-
tion of copyrightability of a work still lies within the power of the
court, the effective determination of "separate artistic identity"
seems now to be in the hands of the Copyright Register.
C. Election Doctrine
From the time the overlapping of copyright and design patent
protection first became possible for works of applied art, courts
have denied dual protection to such works. Adopting the attitude
that the band of overlapping coverage by Congress was inadver-
tent, the courts have compelled an artist to choose either copyright
or design patent, such election barring later alternative coverage.'"
A gradual demise of this doctrine began with Mazer v. Stein.
Although it declined to rule on the election doctrine, which was
not in issue, the Court did hold that patentability of a work does
not bar copyrightability.13 The court further distinguished the
scope of protection offered by patent and copyright, noting that
"copyright protects originality, rather than novelty or inven-
tion. . . ."
Overlap of protection was finally acknowledged judicially in the
1974 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals case of In Re Yar-
dley.141 The court criticized the election doctrine by observing: (1)
that Congress did not require election between copyright and de-
sign patent; (2) that since neither the copyright nor the patent
statutes required an election to be made, the election doctrine was
in direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress;"' and (3) that
the statements in a previous case"* first announcing the doctrine
were dicta, not law. The court asserted that there was no positive
legal authority supporting the doctrine."
According to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, if an
137. 591 F.2d at 801.
138. See Mues at 543; see note 9, supra.
139. 347 U.S. at 217.
140. Id. at 218.
141. 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
142. Id. at 1394.
143. Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150 (C.C.S.E.D. Pa. 1910).
144. 493 F.2d at 1395.
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artist first obtains copyright protection, she will not be precluded
from design patent protection in the same work. The reverse pro-
cedure, however, is not assured. With neither statutory nor Consti-
tutional justification for its position,"" the Copyright Office has
adopted a regulation denying registration to a work of art if a pat-
ent has already issued.1 46
Does the new Copyright Act make the election doctrine obso-
lete? Recall that once a work of authorship is fixed in a tangible
means of expression, it is automatically protected by statutory
copyright.14 7 A question can then be raised whether, because copy-
right protection attaches automatically, a mandatory "election" be-
tween copyright and patent protection can be enforced. If dual
protection is impossible, any work satisfying the requirements for
copyright would seem to be ineligible for design patent; in practice,
virtually all works with any semblance of artistic merit would be
ineligible for a design patent because they would automatically be
eligible for and protected by copyright.
The courts are thus presented with a number of choices regard-
ing dual protection. One possible treatment is simply to skirt the
issue, choosing not to rely on arguments such as the one just
presented, thereby leaving the election doctrine intact. Another
possibility is to use the same reasoning to end the ill-conceived
prohibition against dual protection for which there is neither con-
stitutional nor legislative basis.14 8 Of course, a more direct ap-
proach is also possible. The courts could overrule the election doc-
trine as violating Congressional intent, following the lead of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Presently, there is no indi-
cation which choice the judiciary favors.
II
Practical Application
A. Modern Art and Copyright Law
The Esquire court expressed agreement both with the district
court holding "that the Copyright Act does not enshrine a particu-
145. See note 105, supra.
146. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1980).
147. See note 63 and accompanying text, supra; and 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); House Report
at 52.
148. See notes 142 and 144 and accompanying text, supra; see also Mues at 554.
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lar conception of what constitutes 'art' "'49 and with Justice
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.'50 Justice
Holmes, fearing that works with intrinsic artistic merit might be
denied copyright protection by judges trained only in the law, as-
serted that works with any possibility of appeal to any segment of
the public must be determined by the courts to have artistic value
for copyright purposes.151 But despite its stated agreement with
these concepts, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
bypassed the opportunity to apply them to the case at hand, in-
stead shifting the responsibility for determination of artistic merit
to the Register of Copyright.15 2 The court refused to extend the
spirit of the holding in Bleistein beyond its facts. 53
In contrast, the district court was not confused by the presenta-
tion of Esquire's design. That court found that the Register's inter-
pretation of the regulations amounted to an impermissible discrim-
ination against designs that "emphasize line and shape rather than
the realistic or the ornate . . . ."" The Court reasoned that in
light of Mazer, denial of Esquire's registration amounted to dis-
crimination against abstract works of art. "The forms of the arti-
cles here in dispute are clearly art. . . . [They] are entitled to the
same recognition afforded more traditional sculpture." 155 The cir-
cuit court holding in Esquire turned on its determination that Es-
quire's designs had no independent artistic identity, that they con-
stituted industrial designs only, ineligible for copyright protection.
Despite the apparent theoretical trend indicated in these cases,
however, a substantial obstacle still exists for creators of modern
art applied to useful articles. Although the Supreme Court and
Congress (and even, theoretically, the Esquire court) support the
notion of copyright protection for modern art as well as more
traditional forms,"' there is the obvious practical problem of rec-
149. 591 F.2d at 805.
150. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
151. Id. at 251-52. See note 103, supra.
152. 591 F.2d at 801.
153. Id. at 805; see note 103, supra; the Court held in Bleistein that designs for circus
posters were eligible for copyright protection and were not to be denied protection on the
grounds that mere posters are not good enough to be considered within the scope of works
"connected with the fine arts." 188 U.S. at 251.
154. 414 F. Supp. at 941.
155. Id.
156. See note 103 and accompanying text, supra. "Individual perception of the beautiful
is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art . . . . [An] author's tangible
expression of his ideas . . . , whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image or
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ognition of artistic merit in modern art by untrained individuals.
Artists whose designs are applied to useful articles should take
steps to assist the Register and the courts in recognizing separate
artistic identity in their works of applied art.'5 Possible ways to
accomplish this end include publication of designs or shapes in art
or craft journals, or public display of models as works of art. One-
person or organized group shows would suffice. 158
In addition, in applying for copyright registration, artists should
scrupulously avoid inclusion of any pictorial or graphic representa-
tion or textual reference to utilitarian aspects of their work. The
application could, however, note modern art trends, pointing to
well known modern art works where art and utility are closely in-
tertwined and artistic independence widely recognized. Two exam-
ples are Christo's running fence 59 and I. M. Pei's architectural de-
sign of the east wing of the National Gallery of Art in Washington,
D.C.1e0
If registration is denied, an artist could argue, on administrative
appeal, the apparent inconsistency of granting copyright protection
to the design of a pencil sharpener in the form of an antique tele-
phone,"" while denying it to modern works such as Esquire's lamp.
If possible, the artist should offer statements by experts concerning
the existence of the separate, artistic identity of her work."' Such
reasoning might encourage the Register and the courts to search
for separate artistic identity in styles of work with which they are
unfamiliar.
Of course, once a work is established as a work of art, it will fall
conveying the meaning by modernistic form or color, is copyrightable." Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 214 (1954). See also 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3]; Reiss v. National Quotation Bur., 276
F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
157. See Postscript, notes 19-21 and accompanying text, infra.
158. See Postscript, note 23 and accompanying text, infra.
159. Although the artist did not intend that the running fence along hill crests in Sonoma
County, California, actually function as a fence, had it remained in place, it would have so
functioned. In that circumstance, the running fence would have had to carry a heavier bur-
den in establishing creativity and eligibility for copyright if the artist or the locals had de-
cided to let it actually function as a fence. See 1 NIMMER § 2.08[B][3] at 2-94. Kieselstein-
Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 532 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. The overall shape of Mr. Pei's building is widely recognized as a work of art. Never-
theless, the utilitarian aspect of the overall shape provides a setting maximizing the artistic
qualities of the works displayed and is part of the genius of the design.
161. Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
162. See Postscript, note 31 and accompanying text, infra.
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under the broad protection of Mazer as codified in the Act."* For
works not clearly established as works of art, it is still possible for
the courts to move toward the more liberal Mazer position ex-
pressed in the House Report.
B. Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages of
Design Patent with Copyright for Works of Applied
Art
1. Cost and Term of Protection
Because copyright requirements are less demanding than those
for design patent,16 4 less sophistication is required in filling out a
copyright registration application than a patent application. The
fees for both applications are nominal,1" and therefore the real
difference in cost results from the necessity of legal assistance in
preparing the patent application. Attorney's fees for this service
usually range from $350 to $450.'"
A design patent issues for a maximum of fourteen years,16 7 and
copyright issues for the life of the artist plus fifty years.'es
2. Scope of Protection
Although a design patent offers an absolute monopoly while
copyright offers only a limited monopoly on a design interest, the
advantages of design patent are not always as significant as they
may first appear.
Copyright confers an exclusive right to reproduce the work"' or
apply a work to a utilitarian object,7 0 as well as the exclusive
163. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a).
164. For a discussion of the comparative complexities of copyright versus design patent
applications, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 740-41 (9th
Cir. 1971); see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir.
1951).
165. For design patent, the filing fee on each application is $20; the issue fee is $10 for a
32 -year term, $20 for a 7-year term and $30 for a 14-year term. F. KASE, DESIGNS, A GUIDE
TO OFFICIAL LITERATURE ON DESIGN PROTECTION 333 (1975). A copyright registration applica-
tion must be accompanied by a fee of $10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(2) (1980).
166. Interview with Paul Vapnek, San Francisco patent attorney and Adjunct Professor
of Law, Hastings College of the Law, (Nov. 13, 1979).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1976).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
169. Id. § 106(1).
170. Id. § 113(a).
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rights to distribute copies for sale' 7 ' and display the work or copies
of the work. 7 2 If copyrighted, an artist's particular expression of
an idea is protected, although independent creation is a defense to
a charge of infringement. 7 3 However, if the work is highly per-
sonal, individualistic, and easily recognized as such, it is less sus-
ceptible to a claim of independent creation by another.17 ' In cases
of highly personal works, copyright protection is preferable. 7 5 Al-
though a design patent grants the exclusive right to make, use or
sell the design, this provision offers little protection to highly indi-
vidualistic works which are unlikely to be independently created.
Thus, patent and copyright protection appear to merge in that
both guarantee that protected works cannot be plagiarized or ap-
plied to useful articles by others without creating liability for in-
fringement. Copyright is therefore preferable because of the rela-
tive ease of registration;' the superior capacity of a copyright
claim to withstand attacks on validity;'" the lower cost in ob-
taining registration; 78 and a longer period of protection. 7
Where artistic features are not so distinct from utilitarian func-
tion-such as the overall shape of Esquire's light fixtures, which
emphasized a simple line and form-the artist should seek a design
patent. 80 The more a design is restricted to functional lines, the
more restricted is the artistic expression in creating that design. It
is therefore more likely that other artists will arrive at a substan-
tially similar design. Thus, since independent creation is not a de-
fense, and so not an issue in patent infringement actions, an art-
ist's claim of infringement will not fail on this basis.
Now consider a brief comparison of the tests for infringement of
a copyright and of a design patent: to maintain successfully a copy-
right infringement action, plaintiff must show a substantial simi-
larity in appearance in the eye of the lay observer,'" and either
171. Id. § 106(3).
172. Id. § 106(5).
173. 191 F.2d at 103.
174. For example, consider a detailed artistic drawing which becomes the design for a
stained glass window installed in a private residence.
175. See generally Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility: Copyright
or Design Patent?, 66 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1953).
176. See note 49, supra, and notes 194 and 195, infra, and accompanying text.
177. See note 49, supra, and notes 189-92, infra, and accompanying text.
178. See notes 165 and 166 and accompanying text, supra.
179. See notes 167-68 and accompanying text, supra.
180. See note 175 and accompanying text, supra.
181. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
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actual copying or access to the protected work by the alleged in-
fringer.'"8 Proof of actual copying or access will rebut defendant's
claim to independent creation.183 Plaintiff's proof that his or her
work has had public exposure is strong evidence of access.184
A patent infringement suit also requires substantial similarity in
the eye of the average observer.180 Independent creation, however,
is no defense."' It is irrelevant whether defendant has ever seen
plaintiff's work.
Thus, at first it appears that plaintiff's position is far superior in
a patent infringement action. However, defendant wilf usually
claim that plaintiff's patent is invalid because it fails to satisfy one
of the strict patent requirements. This defense is frequently suc-
cessful.18 7 Furthermore, to be valid, a design patent must disclose a
design that is beyond the skill of the ordinary observer. Therefore,
even if the artist survives the difficult tests of nonobviousness, 88
originality, novelty, and ornamentality in the Patent Office, she
stands a good chance of having the patent declared invalid in an
infringement action.
On the other hand, attacks on the validity of a copyright are
rarely successful."' The originality and creativity requirements are
minimal for copyright.190 Concerning the originality requirement,
one judge noted: "A copyist's bad eyesight or defective muscula-
ture, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently
distinguishable variations" to justify a copyright.' 9 The plaintiff's
position is further strengthened by the fact that a copyright regis-
tration certificate is prima facie evidence of validity."2
In summary, with respect to scope of protection, copyright is
U.S. 863 (1975); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1960); 3 NIMMER § 13.03.
182. 3 NIMMER §§ 13.01[B], 13.02.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Burger Train Systems, Inc. v. Ballard, 552 F.2d 1377, 1381 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 860 (1977). 1 NIMMER § 2.01[A] at 2-10.
186. 191 F.2d at 103: "[Ilndependent reproduction of a copyrighted . . . work is not in-
fringement," whereas it is vis a vis a patent" (citation ommitted). See also L. Batlin & Son,
Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
187. See note 49, supra.
188. See notes 45-53 and accompanying text, supra.
189. 1 NIMMER § 2.01[A] at 2-10.
190. Id.
191. 191 F.2d at 105; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 513 n.4 (2d Cir. 1945).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
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preferable to design patent in many circumstances. If the threat of
independent creation is minimal, the coverage is, in effect, quite
similar. In addition, copyright is more resistant to attack than de-
sign patent on the issue of validity.
3. Requirements
The originality and creativity required for copyright are minimal
if accompanied by a showing of some independent effort on the
part of the artist seeking registration."s On the other hand, the
corresponding novelty requirement for a design patent requires
proof that the design is entirely new and unknown.19" Furthermore,
copyright provisions do not require the same demanding standard
of "nonobviousness" as patents.9 '
Where an artist is seeking to protect the overall shape of a useful
article, however, the creativity requirement of copyright is some-
what stiffer.19e In general, for designs emphasizing simple line and
form applied to useful articles, the ornamentality requirement of
patent might be easier to satisfy than the "separate artistic iden-
tity" test of copyright. The stated purpose of design patent is to
protect "ornamental design" for articles of manufacture.' 7 Al-
though the aesthetic is required in design patent,19 s it is less im-
portant than in copyright. There seems to be less concern in grant-
ing a design patent about "opening the floodgates to widespread
registration of industrial designs" than in granting copyright. 99
Note however that a design deemed to be purely industrial will
also be denied design patent protection.oo
193. See notes 67, 68, 103 and accompanying text, supra.
194. 1 NIMMER § 2.01[A] at 2-10; see note 40 and accompanying text, supra.
195. Correlative with the greater immunity of a patentee is the doctrine of anticipation
which does not apply to copyrights: The alleged inventor is chargeable with full knowledge
of all the prior art, although in fact he may be utterly ignorant of it. . . . [T]he difference
between patents and copyrights is neatly illustrated in the design patent cases. We have
held that such a patent is invalid unless it involves "a step beyond the prior art." [Tihere
must be a substantial advance over the prior art. 191 F.2d at 103-04. See also Schnadig v.
Gaines Mfg. Co., Inc., 494 F.2d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 1974).
196. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 113(b); House Report at 105; Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
197. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
198. See note 35 and accompanying text, supra.
199. See note 38, supra.
200. See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1031 (1969). Hadco Prods., Inc., v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1269 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972). But see Ropat Corp. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 535
F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1976), where a design patent for design (overall shape) of a corn
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Seeking copyright registration of a modern design for overall
shape of a useful article is virtually the only circumstance in which
the requirements for copyright might be more difficult to satisfy
than the requirements for a design patent. Notwithstanding that
possible difficulty, however, copyright registration is possible and
should be sought first. The Esquire opinion, though a notable ob-
stacle to copyright protection, contains language which at least
philosophically recognizes that modern art is valid and entitled to
copyright protection.2 0 1 The artist should make a special effort to
demonstrate explicitly the existence of separate and independent
artistic identity.202
The copyright notice requirement, harshly enforced under the
1909 Act, has been significantly relaxed.2 0 3 There is no correspond-
ing patent requirement of notice.
Finally, the one-year disclosure rule, limiting grants of patents,
is strictly enforced.04 There is no corresponding rule for copyright;
the artist is automatically protected as soon as her work is fixed in
the tangible means of expression.2 05 Therefore, the artist need not
guard against disclosure. In addition, no application for copyright
protection is required, and registration of the work with the Copy-
right Office is permissive.2 "
Conclusion
Considering cost, time, scope of protection, stiffness of require-
ments, length of term of protection, and recognition of validity in
the courts, copyright protection under the new Act for works of
applied art is preferable to design patent protection. However, in
the situation where there is a likelihood of independent creation or
where artistic features are merged with functional features, the
artist should consider seeking design patent protection as well.
popper was granted on an article of manufacture as well as for a distinctive design; Applica-
tion of Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1002 (C.C.P.A. 1967), where a portion of a water fountain
composed entirely of water in motion was "article of manufacture" within the design patent
statute thereby making the pattern for the moving water eligible for design patent; the court
noted that dependence of designs on the mechanical means for producing them is not rele-
vant to their design patentability. Id. at 1001.
201. 591 F.2d at 805.
202. See notes 149-63 and accompanying text, supra.
203. See note 78 and accompanying text, supra.
204. See note 59 and accompanying text, supra.
205. See note 112 and accompanying text, supra.
206. See note 74 and accompanying text, supra.
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Although the election doctrine, which requires the applicant to
choose one type of protection or the other seems on the wane, it
retains vitality in many circuits. Its validity under the new copy-
right act, where copyright protection attaches the moment a work
is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, has not been tested.
Since copyright regulations still provide that copyright registration
will not be granted if a patent has been issued on the work, the
applicant should first seek copyright registration, and then file a
design patent application.
If the applicant seeks both types of protection, she must exercise
caution to avoid "disclosure" of the work more than one year
before the patent application is filed in order to escape the harsh
consequences of the one-year rule. The cases fail to mention
whether copyright registration constitutes a disclosure for the pur-
poses of the one-year rule, but it is better to err on the side of
caution and file the patent application less than one year after the
copyright registration application. Furthermore, the one-year rule
should be kept in mind if the applicant seeks publication of art
work in journals or displays art work publicly. The patent applica-
tion must be filed within one year of such event.
An artist seeking copyright protection for the overall shape of a
utilitarian object should take pains to deal with the problems
raised by Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, especially where such shape em-
phasizes modern line and form as contrasted with more traditional
art. The case law on this subject is too sparse'0 to predict how the
conflicting legislative intent expressed in the House Report and re-
flected in the provisions of the Act will be resolved.
207. See note 119, supra.
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Postscript
In an opinion handed down after this note was written, the issue
of copyrightability of the overall shape of useful articles under the
new Act was considered by the Second Circuit.'
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc. involved a suit for
copyright infringement by Barry Kieselstein-Cord, a successful de-
signer of sculptured belt buckles made of silver or other precious
metals.2 Plaintiff Kieselstein-Cord claimed the buckles were jew-
elry or sculpture and therefore copyrightable subject matter not-
withstanding their utilitarian function.$ Plaintiff's claims to copy-
right were registered by the Copyright Office and effective in 1977
and 1980 respectively.4 Since defendant admitted copying plain-
tiff's designs and selling identical belt buckles made from non-
precious metals, the district court considered only the legal issues
of copyright validity and compliance with statutory notice
requirements.5
Although noting that registration by the Copyright Office was
prima facie evidence of validity under both the 1909 Act and the
new Act,6 the district court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment holding that plaintiff's belt buckles did not fall
within one of the categories of copyrightable subject matter recog-
nized in either statute, regulations or case law.7 The basis for this
holding was a determination that the buckles failed to satisfy the
separate and independent artistic identity test, as required for
copyrightability of useful objects.8 The trial judge declined to de-
termine whether plaintiff satisfied statutory notice requirements
since the buckles were found to be not properly copyrightable.9
The court relied heavily on the reasoning used by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,o
asserting that overall design of useful objects is not copyrightable
even if the designer relied on aesthetic as well as functional consid-
1. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'g 489 F.
Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
2. Id. at 990-91.
3. 489 F. Supp. at 732.
4. Id. at 734.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 738.
8. Id. at 736, 738.
9. Id. at 737.
10. 591 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir..1978).
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erations." The simple, sculptural form of the buckles was found
"to be very similar to the 'overall design or configuration of a utili-
tarian object' that the Esquire court found uncopyrightable."12
Plaintiff's argument that his belt buckles were so unusual and
ornamental that they constituted sculpture did not persuade the
court to rule in his favor.18 The court analogized the issue of copy-
right protection for plaintiff's belt buckles to the issue of copyright
for fashion design, where protection is granted to designs superim-
posed on fabric, but not to overall shape or style of clothing.14
As in Esquire,1" the court relied on what it ascertained to be
Congressional intent on this issue based on Congress' refusal in
1976 to provide copyright protection for original designs for con-
sumer and industrial products regardless of whether or not such
designs could stand by themselves.1 6
Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision. Declaring the
case to be on "the razor's edge of copyright law"17 because of the
necessity, under the current law, of drawing a fine line, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's summary judg-
ment for the defendant and upheld the validity of copyright regis-
tration for plaintiff's designs.18 The court seemed to have no diffi-
culty in distinguishing plaintiff's sculptured designs from ordinary
designs for belt buckles.1' The basis for the distinction and the
holding of separate artistic identity rested on a number of factors.
For example, plaintiffs testimony concerning his personal inspi-
ration and motivation was apparently quite persuasive. The court
noted plaintiff's description of his reliance on art nouveau, ele-
ments of Spanish architecture and a personal image for inspira-
tion.20 "The designer said that he saw 'in [his] mind's eye a corre-
lation between the art nouveau period and the butt of an antique
Winchester rifle' and then 'pulled these elements together graphi-
cally.' "" The opinion also included a detailed description of the
11. 489 F. Supp. at 735.
12. Id. at 736.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 737.
15. 591 F.2d at 800.
16. 489 F. Supp. at 737.
17. 632 F.2d at 990.
18. Id. at 994.
19. Id. at 993.
20. Id. at 990.
21. Id. at 991.
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process by which plaintiffs buckles were manufactured, stressing
the original renderings sketched by plaintiff and the traditional
wax molding and casting technique of metal sculptors."
The court further noted, apparently with approval, the accept-
ance of plaintiff's buckles, donated by plaintiff after commence-
ment of the lawsuit, by the Metropolitan Museum of Art.".
Citing Professor Nimmer's observation that "none of the author-
ities-the Mazer opinion, the old regulations, or the statute-offer
any ready answer to the linedrawing problem inherent in delineat-
ing the extent of copyright protection available for works of
applied art," the court based its decision to reverse on language
contained in the legislative history of the new Act.24 The House
Report explains that "separability [of function and artistic fea-
tures] may occur either 'physically or conceptually.' "2
The court held that plaintiff's buckles contained "conceptually
separable sculptural elements,"*2 noting that appellee's assertion
that mere conceptual separation of an artistic element is not suffi-
cient to establish copyrightability, "flies in the face of legislative
intent . . . .
The final justification for reversal seemed to turn on testimony
by plaintiff's expert witnesses and the determination implied in
the Copyright Office action that "the buckles rise to the level of
creative art."2
The dissent on the other hand regarded as inseparable the inno-
vations of form, and the function of the buckles-"helping to keep
the tops of trousers at waist level."29
Unlike the Esquire majority, however, the dissent in Kieselstein-
Cord expressed serious concern that its reading of the new Act
would selectively deny copyright to three-dimensional, abstract de-
signs artfully but inseparably incorporated into functional objects
while granting it to possibly inferior but independent representa-
tional designs applied to useful objects for enhancement.30 The dis-
22. Id. at 990.
23. Id. at 991.
24. Id. at 992-93, quoting 1 NIMMER, § 2.08[B] at 2-89.
25. House Report at 55, 632 F.2d at 993.
26. 632 F.2d at 993.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 994.
29. Id. (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 994-95.
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sent further observed the likelihood of commercial piracy which
would follow from a narrow reading of the separate, artistic iden-
tity test and concluded that "the crass are rewarded, the artist who
creates beauty is not."31 Congressional refusal in 1976 to grant
copyright protection to industrial design was deemed by the dis-
sent, however, to be more significant than distaste for "flagrant
copying of another's work.""3
Two circuits have now ruled on copyrightability, under the new
Act, of designs for useful articles,3 one narrowly construing the
requirement of separate artistic identity," the other relying on
language in the legislative history to achieve broader copyright
protection."
Based on the Kieselstein-Cord opinion and the backing of the
prestigious Second Circuit inplicit in it, designers of overall shape
of useful articles can perhaps feel more confident than they did
immediately after the Esquire opinion when seeking copyright pro-
tection for their designs. Even the dissent in Kieselstein-Cord of-
fered strong moral support for creators of modern design for useful
articles." Nevertheless, as both opinions observe, the line between
copyrightable subject matter and uncopyrightable industrial design
remains unclear. 7
A noteworthy similarity between the two opinions involves the
ultimate adherence by both circuit courts to the Copyright Regis-
ter's determination of copyrightability."8 In Esquire, plaintiff de-
signer sought copyright registration for the design of his outdoor
light fixtures and was forced to do battle with the Register of
Copyrights." Plaintiff's claims were denied registration on grounds
that his designs were not proper subject matter.4 0 In Kieselstein-
Cord, plaintiff's claims to copyright were registered by the Copy-
right Office, thereby establishing prima facie evidence of validity.41
31. Id. at 994.
32. Id.
33. Esquire, Inc. v.. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. 591 F.2d at 803.
35. See notes 25, 26 and accompanying text, supra.
36. See notes 31, 32 and accompanying text, supra.
37. 591 F.2d at 803; 632 F.2d at 992-93.
38. 591 F.2d at 806; 632 F.2d at 994.
39. 591 F.2d at 798.
40. Id.
41. 489 F. Supp. at 734; see 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. III 1979).
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Kieselstein-Cord's dispute was with an infringer who was claiming
the buckle designs to be uncopyrightable subject matter."' Both
the Second Circuit and the D. C. Circuit ultimately gave considera-
ble weight to the opinion of the Register pn the issue of copyright
validity, both courts expressly holding this to be a major factor in
the final determination."
The notion that there is great difficulty overcoming the Regis-
ter's initial decision is clearly strengthened. Designers are therefore
well advised to prepare their initial applications very thoughtfully.
Of further note on this point is the apparent weight given by the
Second Circuit to plaintiff Kieselstein-Cord's testimony concern-
ing his personal artistic motivation, the testimony of plaintiff's ex-
pert witnesses on the artistic value of the designs, and acceptance
of plaintiff's buckles by a well known museum for its permanent
collection."
Treatment by the remaining circuits of the issue of
copyrightability of works of applied art is not readily predictable,
and should be observed closely by designers and their attorneys.
42. 632 F.2d at 991.
43. 591 F.2d at 802; 632 F.2d at 994.
44. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text, supra.
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